Efficient quantum key distribution with practical sources and detectors by Koashi, Masato
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
06
09
18
0v
1 
 2
3 
Se
p 
20
06
Efficient quantum key distribution with practical sources and detectors
Masato Koashi
Division of Materials Physics, Department of Materials Engineering Science,
Graduate School of Engineering Science, Osaka University,
1-3 Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-8531, Japan and
CREST Photonic Quantum Information Project,
4-1-8 Honmachi, Kawaguchi, Saitama 331-0012, Japan
We consider the security of a system of quantum key distribution (QKD) using only practical
devices. Currently, attenuated laser pulses are widely used and considered to be the most practical
light source. For the receiver of photons, threshold (or on/off) photon detectors are almost the only
choice. Combining the decoy-state idea and the security argument based on the uncertainty princi-
ple, we show that a QKD system composed of such practical devices can achieve the unconditional
security without any significant penalty in the key rate and the distance limitation.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd 03.67.-a
Among various applications of quantum information,
quantum key distribution (QKD) is believed to be the
leading runner toward realization with today’s technol-
ogy. In QKD, the legitimate parties, the sender (Alice)
and the receiver (Bob), do not need to use any inter-
action among photons. It is even presumed that they
do not need precise control over single photons either;
We may substitute practical devices for the ideal single-
photon source and ideal photon-number-resolving detec-
tors. Currently, weak coherent-state pulses from conven-
tional lasers are widely used as light sources, and the
detection apparatus is normally composed of so-called
threshold (or on/off) detectors, which just report the ar-
rival of photons and do not tell how many of them have
arrived. The main question arising here is, under such
compromise on the hardware, whether we can preserve
the main feature of QKD, the security against any at-
tack under the law of quantum mechanics (unconditional
security) [1]. The first proof of such unconditional secu-
rity under the uses of practical sources and detectors was
given by Inamori et al. (ILM) [2], but with a price of a
significant performance drop (see Fig. 3 below). Since
then, it has been a natural goal in the study of QKD
to achieve the four conditions at the same time: (i) un-
conditional security, (ii) practical sources, (iii) practical
detectors, and (iv) high performance, namely, avoiding
any significant performance drop from the ideal case.
The main reason for the performance drop in the ILM
result is the weakness against photon-number splitting
(PNS) attacks [3]. One promising solution [4, 5] to fight
against the PNS attacks has recently been given by the
combination of the decoy-state idea by Hwang [6] and
a sophisticated security argument by GLLP [7]. From
the GLLP argument, one obtains [5] the key rate for the
BB84 protocol [8],
G = −Qf(E)h(E) +Q(1)[1− h(e(1))], (1)
where Q =
∑
nQ
(n) is the rate of events where the light
pulse leads to Bob’s detection and passes the sifting pro-
cess, and Q(n) is the contribution from the events where
Alice’s source has emitted n photons. E is the overall
QBER (quantum bit error rate), and e(n) is the QBER for
the n-photon contribution, namely, QE =
∑
nQ
(n)e(n).
h(E) ≡ −E log2E− (1−E) log2(1−E) is the binary en-
tropy function and f(E) ≥ 1 stands for the inefficiency
in the error correction, which approaches unity in the
asymptotic limit in principle. By randomly inserting de-
coy states, i.e., pulses with different amplitudes, we ob-
tain a good estimation of (Q(1), e(1)), and as a result the
key rate becomes close to the one with a single-photon
source and photon-number-resolving detectors. We em-
phasize here that the GLLP proof is based on an entan-
glement distillation protocol [9, 10], and hence assumes
a detector that effectively squashes the input state into
a qubit. This implies that the use of threshold detectors
is not covered by the GLLP proof. Most of other un-
conditional security proofs [11, 12, 13] aimed at beating
PNS attacks also fail to treat threshold detectors. One
exception [14] is the B92 protocol [15] with an additional
local oscillator (LO), but the practicality of using two
LO’s has yet to be tested in the experiment.
In this paper, we report that this final piece of the
puzzle has been solved by re-deriving the key rate formula
(1), or actually a slightly better one, by extending an idea
in the simple security proofs [16, 17] that do not rely on
entanglement distillation protocols, but on an argument
related to the uncertainty principle. As a result, it is
shown that the four conditions (i)–(iv) mentioned above
can be satisfied by a decoy-state BB84 QKD system.
Alice’s source — We assume that Alice uses a light
source emitting a pulse (system C) in a weak coherent
state, and that she randomizes its optical phase before
she sends it to Bob. Let |n, θ〉C be the state of n photons
in a linear polarization with angle θ. Then, Alice’s signal
state is written as
ρˆC(θ) =
∑
n
µn|n, θ〉CC〈n, θ|, (2)
where µn ≡ e−µµn/n! is the Poissonian distribution with
2FIG. 1: Bob’s receiver with two threshold detectors, D0 and
D1. It is equivalent to a basis-independent filter (F ) followed
by a measurement (MZ or MX).
mean µ. The angle of the polarization is chosen as
θ = θW,a according to her basis choice W = Z,X and
her random bit a = 0, 1, where {θZ,0, θZ,1} = {0, π/2}
and {θX,0, θX,1} = {π/4, 3π/4}. We will use a simplified
notation |a(n)W 〉C ≡ |n, θW,a〉C . All we need in the security
proof is the relation
|a(1)X 〉C = (|0(1)Z 〉C + (−1)a|1(1)Z 〉C)/
√
2, (3)
which means that the single photon part corresponds to
the ideal BB84 source, and the obvious fact that the vac-
uum state is independent of W and a:
|a(0)W 〉C = |vac〉C . (4)
Instead of this actual source, we introduce an equiv-
alent way of producing the same state ρˆC(θW,a) via an
auxiliary qubit A. For any qubit, we will denote the Z
basis as {|0Z〉, |1Z〉}, and the X basis as {|0X〉, |1X〉},
where |aX〉 ≡ (|0Z〉 + (−1)a|1Z〉)/
√
2. First Alice draws
a classical random variable n according to the probabil-
ity distribution {µn}. Then she prepares her qubit A and
the optical system C in state
|Φ(n)W 〉AC ≡ (|0W 〉A|0(n)W 〉C + |1W 〉A|1(n)W 〉C)/
√
2. (5)
Alice can determine her bit value a by measuring qubit
A on the chosen basis W . Since this measurement can
be done at any moment, we assume that it is postponed
toward the end of the whole protocol. From Eq. (3), we
notice that the n = 1 state |Φ(1)W 〉AC is independent of
the chosen basis W , namely,
|Φ(1)X 〉AC = |Φ(1)Z 〉AC . (6)
We can also use Eq. (4) to obtain a simple form for n = 0,
|Φ(0)Z 〉AC = |0X〉A|vac〉C . (7)
Bob’s receiver — We assume that Bob uses a polariza-
tion rotator, a polarization beam splitter, and two thresh-
old detectors with the same efficiency ηd (see Fig. 1). The
dark count probabilities d0 and d1 need not be the same.
Bob chooses his own basis W ′ = Z,X , and set the ro-
tator accordingly such that the polarization with angle
θW ′,0 and the orthogonal polarization θW ′,1 be split and
directed to the two detectors. When neither of the detec-
tors clicks, we say Bob’s outcome is “failure” (“f”). All
the other cases are called “detected” events, and Bob’s
outcome is a bit value b, determined according to which
of the detector has clicked. When both detectors have
clicked, Bob assigns a random value to b. Bob’s W -basis
measurement is thus a three-outcome measurement with
POVM {Fˆ (f)W , Fˆ (0)W , Fˆ (1)W }. The elements for the failure
outcome can be written as
Fˆ
(f)
Z = Fˆ
(f)
X = (1 − d)
∑
n
(1− ηd)nPˆn, (8)
where Pˆn is the projector onto the subspace with n pho-
tons, and d ≡ d0 + d1 − d0d1 is the probability for at
least one of the detectors to have a dark count. Bob’s
W -basis measurement is hence equivalently described by
a basis independent filter F , which determines whether
the outcome is failure or not, followed by two-outcome
measurement MW .
Using the apparatuses just described, Alice sends out
many pulses and Bob analyzes the pulses that arrive after
a possible intervention by Eve. We place no restriction
on the types of attack by Eve. Alice and Bob randomly
chooses a small portion of events with W =W ′ = Z and
determine the rate QZ of detected events and the QBER
EZ , which is the rate of events with a 6= b divided by
QZ . In principle, Alice may have a record of the photon
number n for each event, and the rate can be written as
a sum over the contribution of each n as QZ =
∑
nQ
(n)
Z ,
and similarly we have EZ =
∑
n q
(n)
Z e
(n)
Z , where e
(n)
Z is
the QBER for the n-photon events and q
(n)
Z ≡ Q(n)Z /QZ .
These parameters can be estimated by the use of decoy
states [4, 5, 6]. We also define the X-basis quantities
QX , EX , Q
(n)
X , e
(n)
X in a similar way.
Suppose that after discarding the events used for the
parameter estimation above, Alice and Bob are left with
N detected events with W = W ′ = Z. For simplicity,
here we consider the limit of large N , and neglect the
small fluctuations of the estimated parameters. Alice
concatenates her bit a from each event to form an N -
bit key Z, and she calculates k-bit final key κfin ≡ ZC,
where C is a random rank-k N × k binary matrix. It
is crucial in the proof that we define Alice’s key to be
the ‘correct’ one, and let Bob try to correct errors in his
key to agree on Z. Since the QBER of Bob’s N -bit out-
come in comparison to Alice’s Z should be EZ , Bob’s
errors can be corrected through Nf(EZ)h(EZ) bits of
communication between Alice and Bob. For simplicity,
let us assume that this communication is encrypted by
consuming the same length of previously shared secret
key. The matrix C is made public by Alice, and is used
by Bob to calculate κfin.
3FIG. 2: Three protocols for proving the security. (a) Z-basis
detected events in the actual protocol. (b) Alice’s final key
κfin is the same as in protocol (a), from Eve’s point of view.
(c) Bob tries to predict Alice’s X-basis outcome X .
The security of the final key can be proved by compar-
ing the three protocols shown in Fig. 2. Protocol (a) is
the actual protocol, and in the figure we have used the
fact that Alice’s bit a can be regarded as the outcome of
Z-basis measurement on qubit A. In Protocol (b), Alice
measures κfin as in (a), but Bob’s measurement MZ is
replaced byMX . Since Bob reveals the outcome of F but
not the outcome of MZ in Protocol (a), Eve’s knowledge
about Alice’s final key κfin is the same in (a) and in (b).
In Protocol (c), Alice’s Z-basis measurements are fur-
ther replaced by X-basis measurements. We ask how we
can predict Alice’sN -bit outcomeX from Bob’s outcome
X
∗ and the recorded photon number n for each event.
Let us divide the N events into three groups, n = 0,
n = 1, and n ≥ 2, where each group should consist of
Nq
(0)
Z , Nq
(1)
Z , and N(1− q(0)Z − q(1)Z ) events, respectively.
For the n = 0 group, Eq. (7) assures that Alice’s out-
come is always 0. For the n = 1 group, let us recall
what Alice and Bob do in Protocol (c) from the begin-
ning. Alice first prepares state |Ψ(1)Z 〉AC , and measures
qubit A on X-basis. Bob conducts measurements F and
MX . We notice that, due to Eq. (6), this is identical to
the procedures taken by Alice and Bob in the parameter
estimation with W = W ′ = X and n = 1. Hence we
can use e
(1)
X as the estimation of the error rate between
Alice and Bob for this group. Finally, for the n ≥ 2
group, we have no guarantee on the correlation between
Alice and Bob. Combining these observations, we con-
clude that, given X∗, we can predict with a negligibly
small error probability that X should belong to 2N(H+ǫ)
candidates, where
H = q
(0)
Z × 0 + q(1)Z h(e(1)X ) + (1− q(0)Z − q(1)Z )× 1
= 1− q(0)Z − q(1)Z [1− h(e(1)X )]. (9)
The above fact is enough to prove the security of
the final key κfin when its length is chosen to be k =
N(1 − H − 2ǫ). The sketch of proof is as follows (for a
more comprehensive argument, see Ref. [17]). The ma-
trix C can be equivalently determined by first choosing a
random N× (N−k) matrix C′, and then choosing C un-
der the condition CTC′ = 0. This condition ensures that
the (N − k)-bit observable XC′ and the k-bit observ-
able κfin = ZC commute. Hence in Protocol (b), Alice
can insert the projection measurement for XC′ before
the measurement for κfin, without causing any effect on
the outcome of the latter. Note that the outcome XC′
is N(H + 2ǫ)-bit random parity for X. Since we have
already narrowed the possible values of X into 2N(H+ǫ)
candidates by the knowledge of X∗, the knowledge of
XC′ further narrows them down to a single candidate
with a negligible error. This means that the state of Al-
ice’s N qubits just after the projection measurement for
XC′ is an X-basis eigenstate. The final key κfin is the
outcome of a Z-basis measurement on this X-basis eigen-
state, and hence Eve should have no information about
it, namely, the final key is secure.
In the asymptotic limit N → ∞, ǫ can be set to 0,
and the loss from the parameter estimation can be ne-
glected. The key rate is thus given by GZ = QZ [1−H −
f(EZ)h(EZ )], and substituting Eq. (9) gives
GZ = −QZf(EZ)h(EZ) +Q(0)Z +Q(1)Z [1− h(e(1)X )]. (10)
We can generate the secret key fromW =W ′ = X events
as well, with the rate GX given by exchanging X and Z
in Eq. (10).
In order to compare the derived key rate with the
GLLP formula (1), let us consider the case where Al-
ice and Bob choose the basis X and Z randomly without
any bias, and the available parameters are Q ≡ QZ+QX ,
Q(n) ≡ Q(n)X +Q(n)Z (n = 0, 1), E ≡ QZEZ +QXEX , and
e(1) ≡ (e(1)Z + e(1)X )/2. Eqs. (6) and (8) assure that we
should have Q
(1)
Z = Q
(1)
X regardless of Eve’s attack. The
total key rate G ≡ GZ +GX then satisfies
G ≥ −Qf(E)h(E) +Q(0) +Q(1)[1− h(e(1))], (11)
where the equality holds when EX = EZ and e
(1)
Z = e
(1)
X .
We see that the new formula, which is valid under the use
of threshold detectors, is the same as the GLLP formula
(1) except for a small improvement of the term Q(0).
This term reflects the obvious fact that we do not need
4FIG. 3: The net key generation rate G (bits per pulse) vs
distance. WCP and TD means that the curve is valid when
weak coherent-state pulses and threshold detectors are used,
respectively. Parameters used are from [18]: d = 1.7 × 106,
ηd = 0.045, f(E) = 1.22, the fiber loss 0.21 db/km, and 3.3%
of distance-independent contribution to the QBER.
any privacy amplification for the vacuum contribution
because Eve should have no clue about Alice’s bit if she
emits the vacuum.
Figure 3 shows the key rate in the new proof as a func-
tion of the distance, after optimization over the mean
photon number µ of Alice’s source. The parameters are
borrowed from the experiment by Gobby et al. [18]. We
have also plotted the rate calculated from the previous
argument (ILM) [2] covering the use of threshold detec-
tors. As a comparison, the rate for the ideal single-
photon source and the rate based on GLLP argument
[5] are plotted as broken curves. The small increase in
the distance limit compared to the GLLP curve is due
to the term Q(0). We emphasize here that our main re-
sult is not this nominal increase but the fact that the
new curve is valid for the use of threshold detectors. The
improvement from the previous curve (ILM) under the
same assumption is noteworthy.
In summary, we have shown that even when we build a
QKD system entirely from conventional and well-tested
devices — pulsed lasers and threshold detectors, we can
still enjoy the unconditional security without severe de-
crease in the key rate and in the distance limit. It is also
shown that the celebrated GLLP formula (with a slight
improvement) can now be used for the receivers with
threshold detectors. We hope that the present approach
is also helpful for allowing the use of practical devices
in other protocols such as B92 [15] and SARG04 [19].
It is also interesting to ask whether the security proof
based on the uncertainty principle can handle the QKD
with two-way classical communications [20, 21], which is
based on an idea tightly connected to the entanglement
distillation.
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